Conceptualising an Anti-Digital Forensics Kill Chain for Smart Homes

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ICISSP 2024





28/02/24 - Rome



Agenda

- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Problem with ADF
- 3. The Idea of a Kill Chain
- 4. Conclusions

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Amazon ordered to give Alexa evidence in double murder case

An Echo smart speaker, which features the artificial intelligence voice assistant Alexa, was seized from a home in Farmington where two women were stabbed to death

Anthony Cuthbertson * Wednesday 14 November 2018 22:13 GMT * Comment



US police think Amazon's voice assistant Alexa may have witnessed a double murder (Getty Images)

Your 'smart home' is watching - and possibly sharing your data with the police *Albert Fox Cahn and Justin Sherman*

Smart-home devices like thermostats and fridges may be too smart for comfort - especially in a country with few laws preventing the sale of digital data to third parties



Characteristic and data we access remotely every day can end up in a gray zone outside the clear protections afforded in our homes and offices.' Photograph: Smith Collection/Gado/Getty Images

Computer/Digital Forensics

The role of home devices in police investigations

If a smart speaker captures the audio of a serious crime, can it be used as evidence by the police and prosecution at trial?

August 27, 2019 03:26 PM



There is a possibility that the use of recordings from smart speaker devices could significantly influence criminal trials.

Photo/Pixabay

"The use of *scientifically derived and proven methods* toward the identification, collection, validation, examination, analysis, and presentation of digital evidence while preserving the integrity of the information, including <u>process repeatability</u>, and maintaining a strict <u>chain of custody</u> for the data".

- Definition of Digital Forensics (DFRWS, 2001)

A Goldmine for Evidence Collection

Smart homes offer various digital evidence:

Device Logs (e.g., activities, commands, status changes)

Network Traffic (e.g., data flows between devices, patterns, anomalies)

Sensor Readings (e.g., temperature, motion, light)

User Interactions (e.g., behavioural patterns, schedules, preferences)



Smart Home

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Not All That Glitters is Gold...

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Dealing with "Smart" Criminals








"Attempts to **negatively** affect the existence, amount and/or quality of evidence from a crime scene, or make the analysis and examination of evidence <u>difficult or impossible to conduct</u>".

- Definition of Anti-Digital Forensics

Classification of Anti-Forensics

Anti-Digital Forensics can be classified into four categories:

- > Data hiding
- > Artefact wiping
- > Trail obfuscation
- > Attacks against the forensic process and tool



Implications of ADF

ADF may be used for *legitimate purposes* (e.g., privacy).

However, it adds **complexity** to <u>digital investigations</u>.



It is essential to understand ADF to anticipate and counter emerging threats.

RQ: What are the ADF steps in a Smart Home ecosystem?

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What is a Kill Chain?


A kill chain is a military concept that identifies the structure of an attack.



Understanding a cyber kill chain means

having *knowledge* about $\underline{\text{TTPs}} \Rightarrow$ effective defence strategies.

CySec Kill Chain Examples



| 10 techniques | Resource Development 8 techniques | Initial Access 10 techniques | Execution 14 techniques | Persistence 20 techniques | Privilege Escalation 14 techniques | 43 techniques | Credential Access 17 techniques | Discovery 32 techniques | Lateral Movement 9 techniques | Collection 17 techniques | Command and Control 17 techniques | Exfiltration 9 techniques | Impact 14 techniques |
|---|---|-------------------------------------|--|---|---|---|---|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------|
| Active Scanning (3) | Acquire Access | Content Injection | Cloud Administration Command | Account Manipulation (6) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (5) | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (5) | Adversary-in- the-Middle (3) | Account Discovery (4) | Exploitation of Remote Services | Adversary-in- the-Middle (3) | Application Layer Protocol (4) | Automated Exfiltration (1) | Account Access Removal |
| nformation (4) | Infrastructure (8) | Drive-by Compromise | Command and | BITS Jobs | Access Token | Access Token Manipulation (5) | Brute Force (4) | Discovery | Internal | Archive Collected | Communication | Data Transfer Size Limits | Data Destruction |
| Sather Victim Identity Information (3) | Compromise Accounts (3) | Exploit Public- | Scripting Interpreter (9) | Autostart Execution (14) | Manipulation (5) | BITS Jobs | Credentials from Password II Stores (6) | Browser Information Discovery | Spearphishing Lateral Tool | Data (3) Audio Capture | Through Removable Media | Exfiltration | Data Encrypted for Impact |
| Sather Victim Network | Compromise Infrastructure (7) | Application | Container Administration Command | Boot or Logon | Manipulation (6) Boot or Logon | Build Image on Host Debugger Evasion | Exploitation for Credential | Cloud Infrastructure Discovery | Transfer | Automated | Content | Alternative Protocol (3) | Data Manipulation (3) |
| Sather Victim Org | Develop Capabilities (4) | Remote Services | Deploy Container | Scripts (5) | Autostart Execution (14) | Deobfuscate/Decode | Access | Cloud Service Dashboard | Service Session | Browser | Data | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Defacement (2) Disk Wipe (2) |
| Information (4) Phishing for | Establish Accounts (3) | Hardware Additions | Exploitation for Client Execution | Browser Extensions | Boot or Logon Initialization | Files or Information Deploy Container | Authentication | Cloud Service Discovery | Hijacking (2) Remote | Session Hijacking | Encoding (2) | Exfiltration | Endpoint Denial of |
| nformation (4) | Obtain Capabilities (6) | Phishing (4) | Inter-Process Communication (1) | Compromise Client Software Binary | Scripts (5) Create or | Direct Volume Access | Forge Web Credentials (2) | Cloud Storage Object Discovery | Services (8) Replication | Clipboard Data Data from | Obfuscation (3) Dynamic | Over Other Network Medium (1) | Service (4) Financial Theft |
| earch Open | Stage Capabilities (6) | Replication Through Removable | Native API | Create Account m | Modify System Process (4) | Domain Policy Modification (2) | Input Capture (4) | Container and Resource Discovery | Through Removable Media | Cloud Storage Data from | Resolution (3) Encrypted | Exfiltration Over Physical | Firmware |
| echnical atabases (5) | coputation (6) | Media | Scheduled Task/Job (5) | Create or | Domain Policy Modification (2) | Execution Guardrails (1) | Modify Authentication | Debugger Evasion | Software | Configuration Repository (2) | Channel (2) | Medium (1) | Inhibit System |
| earch Open /ebsites/Domains (2) | | Supply Chain Compromise (3) | Serverless Execution | Modify System Process (4) | Escape to Host | Exploitation for Defense Evasion | Process (8) Multi-Factor | Device Driver Discovery | Deployment Tools | Data from Information | Fallback Channels | Exfiltration Over Web II Service (4) | Recovery Network Denial of |
| earch Victim-Owned | | Trusted Relationship | Shared Modules | Event Triggered Execution (16) | Event Triggered Execution (16) | File and Directory Permissions Modification (2) | Authentication Interception | Domain Trust Discovery | Taint Shared Content | Repositories (3) | Ingress Tool Transfer | Scheduled Transfer | Service (2) Resource |
| ITEL/SILVES | | Valid Accounts (4) | Software Deployment Tools | External Remote Services | Exploitation for Privilege | Hide Artifacts (11) | Multi-Factor Authentication | File and Directory Discovery | Use Alternate Authentication | Local System | Multi-Stage Channels | Transfer Data | Hijacking |
| | | | System Services (2) | Hijack Execution | Escalation | Hijack Execution Flow (12) | Request Generation | Group Policy Discovery | Material (4) | Data from Network Shared Drive | Non-Application Layer Protocol | to Cloud Account | Service Stop System |
| | | | User Execution (3) III Windows | Flow (12) Implant Internal | Execution Flow (12) | Impair Defenses (11) | Network Sniffing | Log Enumeration | | Data from Removable | Non-Standard Port | | Shutdown/Reboot |
| | | Man | Management | Image | Process Injection (12) | Impersonation | OS Credential Dumping (8) | Discovery Network Share | | Media | Protocol | | |
| | | | | Authentication Process (8) | Scheduled Task/Job (5) | Indicator Removal (9) | Steal Application | Discovery | | Data Staged (2) | Tunneling Proxy (4) | | |
| | | | | Office Application | Valid Accounts on | Execution Masquerading m | Access Token Steal or Forge | Network Sniffing Password Policy | | Collection (3) | Remote Access | | |

ATT&CK Matrix for Enterprise

layout: side - show sub-techniques hide sub-techniques

3. The Idea of a Kill Chain

A Double Scenario







A Double Scenario (1)



Mr. X seeks to *evade DF detection* by <u>tampering with and destroying digital</u> <u>evidence</u> from Smart Home IoT devices.

Believing he can create a *false narrative* to defend against charges, **Mr. X** <u>leverages the Kill Chain</u> to carry out his **digital alibi** fabrication scheme.

A Double Scenario (2)

Mrs. Y aims to <u>understand the steps</u> Mr. X took to hinder the investigation in the Smart Home crime scene.

Mrs. Y applies the ADF Kill Chain <u>for Digital Forensics purposes</u>, bringing out Mr. X's tactics to **counteract** the digital alibi fabrication.



An ADF Kill Chain for Smart Homes

The ADF Kill Chain aim is twofold:

> Malicious actors can leverage it as a tool for the exploitation of forensic vulnerabilities.

> Understanding adversary tactics to empower *law enforcement* to counter those efforts.







3. The Idea of a Kill Chain

Research Goals



Review of ADF in Smart Home

Intersection of **Privacy and ADF**

Integration of **AI** for ADF in Smart Home

Design of ADF Kill Chain for Smart Home

Case studies and real-world applications

A Preliminary Conceptualisation

Step A – **Tampering with Digital Traces**

<u>Objective</u>: Manipulate or erase digital traces to obstruct forensic investigation.

<u>Activities</u>: Tampering with audio recordings, video footage, and device interaction logs. Implementing techniques to make forensic analysis challenging.

Step B – Concealing Identities

<u>Objective</u>: Conceal the identity of malicious actors involved in ADF activities.

<u>Activities</u>: Masking IP addresses and digital footprints. Falsifying user identities associated with Smart Home devices.

Step C – **Misleading Investigators**

<u>Objective</u>: Introduce false information to mislead forensic investigators.

<u>Activities</u>: Planting deceptive digital breadcrumbs and manipulating timestamps and metadata.

Step D – Cloud Data Manipulation

<u>Objective</u>: Manipulate data stored in cloud services associated with Smart Home devices.

<u>Activities</u>: Getting remote access to cloud services where Smart Home data is stored. Tamper with or delete such data remotely, ensuring techniques to avoid logging.

Expected Challenges

- 1. Device heterogeneity
- 2. Resource constraints and scalability
- 3. Forensic readiness
- 4. Cloud services





Kill two birds with a chainBetter discernment of ADF

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Conclusions

This paper encouraged future research to **enhance the comprehension** of **ADF**, in particular within *Smart Home* ecosystems.

26

Ethical concerns for a criminal-supported Kill Chain are alleviated by the **dual outcome** of understanding adversarial tactics (**Anti-Anti-Forensics**).

Future work:

- Fulfil research objectives
- Overcome expected challenges




Thanks for your attention!

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Non-malicious QR (maybe)